



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
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
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29 November 1963

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
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

29 November 1963

DAILY BRIEF

South Vietnam: The Viet Cong plans to sustain the heavy pace of Communist military activity which they have maintained since 1 November.

The Communist Liberation Front in South Vietnam on 20 November called for attacks "in the immediate future." Objectives are described as the destruction of strategic hamlets and a more rapid development of Viet Cong forces.

Information received from US military officials in Saigon now indicates that the 24 November attack on two strategic hamlets in central South Vietnam was successfully repulsed. According to the report, the Viet Cong suffered some 30 casualties in contrast to government losses of 6 killed, 3 wounded, and 39 missing.

This official US report does not substantiate earlier press reports that more than 1,000 tribesmen were missing. The press on 27 November quoted official spokesmen who stated that many villagers returned soon after the Viet Cong departed.

Viet Cong actions against tribal settlements have in the past resulted in the temporary kidnapping or flight of tribesmen.

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CUBAN ARMS

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STOCK AREA




SLIDE AREA



GRIP AREA



MACHINE PISTOL, U.Z.I. (Israeli Design)
Manufactured by Fabrique National, Belgium
Cal. 9mm, Short



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
* Cuba-Venezuela: The discovery of a large cache of weapons of Cuban origin, announced by Venezuelan authorities on 28 November, provides the best evidence in recent years of major Cuban support for Latin American subversives.

The Venezuelan Foreign Minister has announced that Caracas will lay formal charges concerning the arms cache before a special meeting of Latin American Foreign Ministers scheduled for December. Following this, Caracas will ask that the Council of the Organization of American States be convoked for consultation on the matter.

There is definite proof to support the Venezuelan claim that the weapons came from Cuba. The approximately three tons of weapons include light automatic rifles and submachine-guns identified as among those shipped to Cuba [redacted] in 1959 and 1960. There were also mortars, bazookas, recoilless rifles, and ammunition of US manufacture.



The cache was found on 1 November on a beach in Falcon State, scene of the most active guerrilla effort. The Venezuelan government assumes that the weapons were sent from Cuba by sea. [redacted]



For more than three years, the Castro regime has tried to avoid actions that would clearly implicate it in direct support of Latin American subversives. This exception seems to demonstrate either the high degree of urgency which Castro now gives to his subversive effort, or his estimate that the Venezuelan situation now is ripe for a final offensive. [redacted]

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DAILY BRIEF

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* Venezuela: President Betancourt is determined to hold the national elections on 1 December in spite of increased terrorism by the Communist-directed Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN).

Only a complete catastrophe, such as assassination of one or more of the leading candidates, could now result in a postponement. A party cannot substitute a candidate for one who does not survive until election day, and the results of an election held after an assassination would be challenged in the courts and probably voided.

Most observers on the scene forecast the victory of Raul Leoni of Betancourt's Democratic Action party. Others anticipate the election of old-time socialist Jovito Villalba of the Republican Democratic Union.

About 25 percent of the 3,369,986 registered voters will be youths voting for the first time, and they may add considerably to Villalba's total. In addition, the Communists, who have vowed to boycott the elections, may vote for Villalba if they believe their votes will defeat Leoni.

Future dangers to stability will arise in the period between the elections and the inauguration in March. The FALN will continue and perhaps intensify its efforts to disrupt the constitutional succession, which would be the first in Venezuela's history. Military leaders, moreover, may find Betancourt's successor unacceptable and intervene.

No party will win a majority in congress, and the political jockeying to form coalitions during the lame duck session will weaken the government's decisiveness and power to act.

Brazil: Recent statements by President Goulart and other prominent politicians are keeping political tensions high.

Comments by Goulart to the effect that "social disaster" may be impending if reforms are not enacted have drawn sharp criticism from several moderate and conservative leaders. They have also encouraged renewed plotting by rightist elements, [redacted]

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Adding to the unrest are reports that strains are increasing among the military as a result of the recent arrest of an army officer who last month refused an order to arrest Governor Carlos Lacerda. This situation has widened the political rift in the army between officers and sergeants. [redacted]

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Turkey: [The collapse of the coalition government appears to be complete, but no formal action will be taken until Prime Minister Inonu returns from Washington this week end.]

[The withdrawal of a second member of the coalition, the New Turkey Party, on 27 November is virtually certain to bring the government down. The other minor party in the coalition had voted to secede the previous day.]

[The new government probably will be either a coalition between Inonu's Republican People's Party and the opposition Justice Party, or a national coalition of all parties. In either event, [] Inonu is likely to be replaced by some less controversial figure.]

[The attitude of the military remains a critical element in the picture. Although in the past military leaders have been hostile to the Justice Party as the heir to the ousted Menderes regime, they now reportedly wish to bring it into the government in order to keep it under closer watch.]

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DAILY BRIEF

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NOTES

* South Korea: President-elect Pak Chong-hui's success in winning control of the unicameral legislature in the 26 November elections improves the prospects for the smooth operation of the new constitutional government. However, political stability will still depend on Pak's willingness to rule with moderation. If he interprets this victory as a popular mandate to pursue an aggressive authoritarian program, he could provoke serious unrest. (

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DAILY BRIEF

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THE PRESIDENT

Executive Offices of the White House

- Special Counsel to the President
- The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
- The Scientific Adviser to the President
- The Director of the Budget
- The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Department of State

- The Secretary of State
- The Under Secretary of State
- The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
- The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
- The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
- The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

- The Secretary of the Treasury
- The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

- The Secretary of Defense
- The Deputy Secretary of Defense
- The Secretary of the Army
- The Secretary of the Navy
- The Secretary of the Air Force
- The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
- The Assistant Secretary of Defense
- The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
- Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
- Chief of Staff, United States Army
- Commandant, United States Marine Corps
- U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
- Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
- Commander in Chief, Pacific
- Commander in Chief, Atlantic
- The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
- The Director, The Joint Staff
- The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
- The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
- The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
- The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

- The Attorney General
- The Federal Bureau of Investigation
- The Director

The Atomic Energy Commission

- The Chairman

The National Security Agency

- The Director

The United States Information Agency

- The Director

The National Indications Center

- The Director

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